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Abstract. The paper presents first empirical evidence on the effect of foreign ownership on the 
union wage premium. Using matched employer-employee data for Denmark, the positive effect of 
plant-level unionisation on wages is found to vanish in foreign-owned firm. While the estimation 
establishes a positive wage effect of foreign ownership of between two and four per cent for workers 
employed in non-unionised firms, the foreign ownership premium is close to zero for workers in 
highly unionised enterprises. This result might help to understand why trade unions frequently resist 
foreign take-overs even though the existence of a positive foreign ownership wage premium is widely 
acknowledged in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades or so foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased sharply, both in 
absolute terms but also relative to the levels of GDP and trade.1 While FDI is often perceived to be 
beneficial to the host country, for instance through inflows of new technologies, trade unions 
frequently fight foreign take-overs. They fear employment losses but also downward pressure on 
wages. A commonly expressed concern in that respect is that globalization in general and FDI in 
particular will erode the bargaining power of workers forcing them to accept lower wages. In fact, 
while there is now a sizeable theoretical literature that generally confirms these concerns, empirical 
evidence on the issue is virtually nonexistent. The present paper aims at filling this gap.  
Prior to presenting the empirical framework and the results of the study, related research is briefly 
described. A number of theoretical contributions discuss the wage effects of multinational enterprises 
in unionised labour markets. In an early contribution, Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) set up a partial 
equilibrium duopoly model and show that a credible threat to shift production abroad improves the 
bargaining position of a firm and, hence, the negotiated wage falls. The result can be understood as 
follows: in the case of a disagreement between the two bargaining parties production of a national firm 
will plummet to zero as workers go on strike. On contrary, a multinational firm can still serve the 
market via it foreign production facility. Going multinational therefore increases the firm’s outside 
option in the wage bargain. 
Zhao (1995) construct a partial equilibrium model of cross-hauling FDI under wage bargaining 
and also finds a negative effect of FDI on the negotiated wage. In an extension, Zhao (1998) considers 
a general equilibrium model with full employment in which the outside option of workers is 
endogenously determined by the wage rate in a perfectly competitive sector.2 FDI then depresses the 
negotiated wage through the threat point effect but also through an additional collusion effect.3 
Skaksen and Sørensen (2001) use a similar (partial equilibrium) setup and show that the welfare 
consequences of FDI for unionised workers depend on the degree of substitutability between the 
activities of the multinational firm in the home and the host country. The union gains in terms of 
bargaining power when the activities are perfect complements and the firm engages in vertical FDI.4 
In the case of perfect substitutes, which corresponds to the case of horizontal multinationals, FDI will 
depress wages. 
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 For an overview of stylised facts on FDI see, for instance, chapter 1 of Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
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 In a recent contribution, which also makes use of a general equilibrium framework, Eckel and Egger (2006) 
analyse the role of trade unions for the decision of firms to either serve a foreign market through exports or 
through production of a local subsidiary. The second production facility again increases the outside option and 
firms face a trade-off between lower wages and higher fixed costs in their decision to become multinational. A 
higher ratio of multinationals firms compared to exporters lead to lower wage payments in general equilibrium. 
3
 Firms in the two countries are found to partially cooperate against the union. The degree of competition then 
goes down and so does output. 
4
 Note, however, that this result should be less relevant in the context of developed countries since for these 
countries inward FDI is largely dominated by horizontal FDI. Therefore, the negotiated wage rises as a 
consequence of (vertical) FDI. 
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However, almost none empirical study has substantiated the results derived in the theoretical 
literature. To the best of my knowledge Choi (2001) is the only study that comes up with evidence on 
the threat effect of FDI. Using an industry level panel data set he shows that the union wage premium 
in the US manufacturing sector is negatively associated with the stock of outward FDI. On contrary, a 
large literature documents a positive wage premium in foreign-owned firms,5 even though recent 
evidence based on matched employee-employer data suggests that the wage premium is lower than 
previously thought (see Girma and Görg, 2007, and Heyman et al., 2007). At first sight, the empirical 
finding seems to contradict the theoretical prediction. However, foreign ownership may benefit the 
average workers but nevertheless hurt the wage setting capacity of trade unions. 
Against this background, the present study provides an empirical assessment of the effects of 
foreign ownership on the union wage premium in Denmark. For doing so, I use a detailed matched 
employer-employee dataset that covers the total Danish population for the years 2000 to 2002. The 
dataset identifies foreign-owned firms, provides information on trade union membership and allows 
me to construct measures of union density at the firm level. 
In accordance with previous studies, the analysis generally confirms the existence of a small 
positive wage premium of between two and four per cent associated with foreign ownership, even 
after controlling for firm and individual characteristics and accounting for individual specific 
heterogeneity. The estimation also identifies a positive wage effect of union density. High degrees of 
unionisation can be expected to improve the bargaining situation of unions through e.g. its impact on 
the  ability of workers to inflict a loss on the firm during a labour dispute (Barth et al., 2000). 
The positive union density effect vanishes in foreign-owned firms. Hence, trade unions are not 
able to secure higher wages in highly unionised enterprises that are owned by foreigners. The analysis 
also establishes a very small union membership premium that is not affected by foreign ownership. 
Taking together the positive general wage effect of foreign ownership and the negative effect on the 
union density wage premium, the overall effect of foreign ownership on wages of workers in highly 
unionised enterprises is close to zero. These findings might help to understand why trade unions resist 
foreign take-overs even though the empirical literature widely acknowledges the existence of a foreign 
ownership wage premium. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional 
framework in Denmark and argues that the question at hand can readily be studied with respect to 
Denmark. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and provide descriptive statistics. The empirical 
specification is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical results, while Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Framework 
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 See, for instance, Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) for the US, Girma et al. (2001) and Griffith (1999) for the UK.  
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Denmark is traditionally characterised by high levels of union density. Schnabel and Wagner 
(2007) report that in 2002/03 83.6 per cent of all employees in Denmark were members of a trade 
union. Adjusted union density, union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in 
employment, amounted to 70.4 per cent in 2003 according to Visser (2006). These figures put 
Denmark at the upper range of OECD countries. Similarly, the great majority of workers are covered 
by collective bargaining agreements. In the private sector, 71 per cent of all workers were covered by 
collective agreements with the figure reaching 100 per cent in the public sector (Behrens and Traxler, 
2002). 
Wage rates laid down in collective agreements may be founded on three different systems. First, 
the standard wage system specifies actual earnings in an industry wide agreement and was historically 
the predominant system for unskilled workers. Second, the minimum wage system determines a floor 
that provides a basis for actual earnings and is used for young or inexperienced workers only. In 
further negotiations supplements that typically depend on personal characteristics are fixed. Finally, 
the minimum pay system effectively delegates bargaining to the plant-level only subjected to some 
minimum wage floor. 
In the 1990s there was a clear shift away from the standard wage system towards more 
decentralised forms of wage formation. Employers aimed at tailoring wages more strictly to the 
performance of the individual firm (Traxler et al., 2001). While the minimum pay system is now the 
most important of the systems described above, in 2004 only 16 per cent of the workers were 
employed under the centralised standard wage system (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 2005). 
The trend towards decentralisation of the wage bargaining is also reported by the OECD (2004). 
In the 1970s Denmark was classified as having the highest possible centralisation level on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 5. The country was accordingly characterised by “Central level agreements of 
overriding importance”. Centralisation levels came down successively and the indicator reached a 
value of 2 for the period from 1995 to 2000. This suggests a combination of industry and company / 
plant level bargaining, with an important share of employees being covered by company bargains. 
Note that there exists no practice of administrative extension or enlargement of private-sector wage 
agreements in Denmark (OECD, 2004). 
In summary, the institutional framework shares two features that allow me to study the question at 
hand. First, unions have a strong influence on the wage setting process in Denmark. Second, collective 
bargaining mainly takes place at the plant-level. Hence, one can expect plant-level characteristics in 
general and foreign ownership in particular to play an important role in wage settlements. A possible 
concern is, perhaps slightly paradoxically, the very high degree of unionisation in Denmark. In 
particular, one may expect widespread spill-over effects.6 The union wage premium is then likely to be 
rather small despite of the importance of trade unions in Denmark. 
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 For a dicussion of this point and an empirical application for another country with a high degree of 
unionisation, namely Norway, see Mastekaasa (1993). 
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3. Data Description 
 
The study utilises data from the Integrated Data Base (IDA) for Labor Market Research combined 
with firm level information both compiled by Statistics Denmark.7 Based on administrative registers 
the data covers the total Danish population for the years 1999 to 2002. IDA provides a large number of 
individual socio economic characteristics such as age, gender, work experience, and educational 
attainment. The dependent variable of the regression is (the log of) the nominal hourly wage rate 
which is calculated by Statistics Denmark. Of particular importance to the present study is the 
information on membership in a trade union. 
Each individual can be linked to a workplace which in turn can be matched with firm level 
information. In particular, I obtain data on the size of the firm in terms of its workforce, the capital-
labour ratio, the share of exports in total sales, and industrial classification. Information about foreign 
ownership is available since 2000. A firm is classified as being foreign-owned when more than 50% of 
the firm are owned by foreigners. Moreover, the foreign direct investment has to amount to more than 
DKK 10 million. Therefore, the definition used by Statistics Denmark might fail to identify small 
foreign-owned firms in the data. 
Another potential problem is the fact that it is not possible to identify Danish multinational 
enterprises. These firms may have a bargaining position which is comparable to foreign-owned firms. 
Hence, any established negative effect of foreign ownership on the union wage premium might be 
considered as a lower bound on the corresponding effect of multinationals on union wages. 
The nature of the data set also allows me to calculate indicators for the average characteristics of 
the workers employed in a firm. Variables indicating the share of females, age composition and skill 
groups in the total workforce are computed. More importantly, union density at the company level is 
calculated as the fraction of employees that are members of a trade union. 
For the analysis, attention is confined to full-time employees aged 18 - 65 working in the private 
sector. The sample then consists of 2169277 observations. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In line with previous empirical evidence Table 1 shows that on average workers earn considerably 
higher wages when employed in a firm owned by foreigners. The figure suggests that the 
unconditional wage premium stands at 11.85 per cent. Descriptive statistics also reveal that workers in 
foreign owned firms are better educated and more likely to be living in Copenhagen than in other areas 
of Denmark. However, there seems to be no difference in the inclination to join a trade union. Both in 
foreign-owned and in Danish firms at about 83 per cent of all individuals in our dataset are members 
of a trade union. 
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 For a more detailed description of the IDA dataset see, among others, Abowd and Kramarz (1999). 
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Next, descriptive statistics are provided for members of a trade union and for employees working 
in a firm with a union density of 75 % or above. Note first that low and medium skilled workers as 
well as males are overrepresented among trade union members. This may be part of the explanation 
for the perhaps surprising finding that union members earn slightly less than an average worker. While 
the effect is evident for union members in foreign-owned and in Danish firms, it is particularly strong 
for workers employed in the former type of firm. Accordingly, the unconditional foreign ownership 
premium shrinks to 9.74 per cent for union members.  
A similar but more pronounced finding emerges when considering only those workers that are 
employed in highly unionised enterprises. On average the individual hourly wage is lower in firms 
with strong unions than it is in enterprises with lower union densities. While the effect is rather small 
for Danish firms, the negative union density effect is quite substantial for foreign-owned firm. 
Consequently, the foreign ownership premium declines to merely 6.66 per cent when considering only 
employees in high density firms. 
Part of the foreign ownership premium may be due to differences in observable firm 
characteristics. Table 2 shows that indeed Danish and foreign-owned firms differ systematically from 
each other. In particular, foreign-owned enterprises tend to be larger, more capital-intensive and export 
more than their Danish counterparts.8 There are also significantly more foreign-owned firms present in 
the wholesale and retail trade sector and in the manufacturing sector. On contrary, they are under-
represented in the construction and transport sector. Note also that 21.2 per cent of the workforce of an 
average foreign-owned firm consists of high-skilled workers while the figure stands at just 8.9 per cent 
for Danish firms. 
Finally, Table 2 also shows that high density firms tend to be somewhat larger than firms with a 
lower share of trade union members. Moreover, firms with a high union density are more frequent in 
the manufacturing and the construction sector as compared to an average enterprise. In contrast, they 
are underrepresented in the financial intermediation sector. 
 
5. Empirical Specification 
 
The following wage equation for individual i working in firm j at time t is estimated 
 
ln ijt it jt it jt jt it jt jt jt t i j ijtw X Z UM UD F UM F UD Fα β δ φ γ µ ρ λ α θ ε= + + + + + + + + + +  
 
with the dependent variable, ln wijt, being the gross hourly wage of individual i. Xit is a vector of 
observed individual characteristics including age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, actual working 
experience, experience squared, as well as dummies for educational attainment, a full set of 
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 Note, however, that these findings may partly be due to the fact that smaller foreigned-owned firms are not 
identified according to the definition of foreign-owned enterprises used by Statistics Denmark. 
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occupational and regional dummies, and a dummy for small children in the household. Zjt contains 
firm characteristics, namely the capital labour ratio, the percentage of exports in total sales and the 
logarithm of the number of full-time equivalent employees in the firm. Furthermore, Icontrol for 
average characteristics of the workforce. 
In order to assess the influence of trade unions on the individual wage, a dummy variable for 
union membership of individual i and the union density in enterprise j are included as additional 
explanatory variable. The union density variable should be of particular interest to the analysis since it 
is likely to reflect the strength of a union in the wage bargain.9  Among the studies that have found a 
positive wage effect of union density are Booth and Chatterji (1995) for the UK,  Barth et al. (2000) 
for Norway and Reilly (1996) for Canada. Union membership differentials are also widely 
documented in the literature but open to a number of interpretations.10 In fact, some studies find the 
union membership premium to vanish once union density is controlled for (see again, e.g., Barth et al., 
2000, and Reilly, 1996).  
The dummy Fjt indicates whether or not a firm is owned by foreigners. The union membership and 
the union density variable are interacted with the foreign ownership dummy. This allows me to study 
the central question of this paper, namely whether or not the influence of trade unions on the wage 
setting process in multinational firms differs from its influence in Danish firms. The theoretical 
literature predict the bargaining strength of a union to deteriorate in foreign-owned firms. 
Accordingly, the interaction term between union density and foreign ownership can be expected to 
enter the regression equation with a negative sign. 
Finally, αi, λt, and θj are fixed individual-, time- and firm-effects, respectively, and εijt is the error 
term. 
Provided that unobserved specific effects are uncorrelated with our variables of interest, consistent 
estimates could be obtained by pooling the data and estimating the model by conventional OLS. 
However, it is a problem well-known in the respective literature that union membership but also union 
density can be correlated with unobservable individual specific characteristics that affect the wage rate 
(see, for instance, Lewis, 1986). For instance, unionized firms might be able to choose from a larger 
pool of (queuing) workers. In such a situation, a positive correlation between (unobserved) individual 
ability and the degree of unionisation at the workplace can arise. Similar arguments might also cast 
doubt on the OLS estimates of the foreign ownership premium. Therefore, fixed effect estimation is 
used in order to remove unobservable (time-invariant) individual specific heterogeneity. 
In principle, our estimates could still be confounded by unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. 
This should not play a major role with respect to the union membership and union density estimates 
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 As mentioned in the introduction, Barth et al. (2000) set up a theoretical model in which union density 
improves the bargaining position of trade union through its impact on the conflict payoffs. Alternative 
explanation for why union density can affect wages are provided by Grossman (1983) and Booth and Chatterji 
(1995).  
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 An explanation for a positive union membership premium is preferential treatment of unions members with 
respect to promotions. See Barth et al. (2000) for an overview. Andrews et al. (1998) dicuss the importance of 
methodological differences in the estimations of union/non-union wage differentials. 
8 
since I am able to control for all important firm characteristics identified in the union wage premium 
literature.11 However, foreign-owned firms might exhibit unobserved characteristics that 
systematically differ from domestic firms and affect individual wages. Both firm- and individual-
specific effects can be eliminated by defining worker-firm combinations (or ‘spells’) and estimating a 
spell fixed-effects model. Note that the estimation then hinges solely on within-establishment 
variation. For instance, the foreign-ownership premium is only identified through changes of the 
ownership status of a given firm (but workers switching from a domestic to a foreign-owned firm or 
vice versa will not contribute to the identification). Consequently, in a short panel such as ours the 
spell-effects regression is only able to detect the immediate effects of foreign take-overs on wages. 
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering on the firm-level thereby allowing for a shared error 
component. See Moulton (1990) for further details. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Complete Sample 
 
I start with estimating the wage equation for the complete sample consisting of 2169277 
observations.  
 
Linear Union Density Term 
 
Table 3 presents the results of an individual fixed effects regression of the log individual 
hourly wage on foreign ownership, union density, union membership, and interactions of the union 
variables with the foreign ownership status. The foreign ownership variable enters positively and is 
highly statistically significant; the point estimate stands at .0616. The regression result also suggests 
that union density has a positive and highly statistically significant effect on wages. However, the 
positive coefficient estimate of .0532 for Danish firms is not confirmed for foreign-owned firms. 
Taking into account the interaction term between union density and foreign ownership, the influence 
of union density on wages vanishes. In fact, in foreign-owned firms wages are even slightly negatively 
affected by the percentage of workers organised in a trade union. 
Nevertheless, even in firms with a high degree of unionisation workers still benefit from 
foreign owners. However, the foreign ownership wage premium is much smaller for employees in 
firms with a highly unionised workforce. To take the extreme case: for workers employed in firms 
with a union density rate of 100 per cent, the premium shrinks to merely 0.5 per cent.12 This compares 
to 6.16 per cent for workers employed in companies without any trade union member. Clearly, in the 
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 In particular, it has been found that firm size is a non-negligible control variable when estimating union wage 
premia (see Andrews et al. 1998). 
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 (.0616 – .0032 * 1.00) – .0532 * 1.00 = .0052. 
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latter type of firms the deterioration of union’s bargaining power due to foreign takeovers does not 
affect the wages of employees. 
How robust are these results to the inclusion of control variables? In columns (2) to (7) 
individual characteristics, year, occupational and industry dummies, as well as firm and co-worker 
characteristics are added to the baseline equation. While the qualitative results remain unchanged, the 
coefficient estimates are markedly smaller once individual characteristics are controlled for. In 
particular, the effect of union density on individual wages shrinks and the coefficient estimates vary 
between .0098 and .0174 depending on the exact specification. The estimates of the foreign ownership 
premium for workers in non-unionised firms vary between 3.17 and 4.09 per cent. Due to the negative 
effect of foreign ownership on the wage setting capacity of unions, the premium falls for higher union 
density levels. Depending on the specification, the estimates range from 0.41 to 0.84 per cent for 
workers employed in fully unionised firms. 
The picture changes drastically once firm specific heterogeneity is accounted for by running a 
spell fixed effects estimation. Column (8) documents that neither the foreign ownership nor the union 
density variable is statistically significant any more. Even the signs of the coefficient estimates are not 
preserved. This may point to the existence of unobserved firm-specific effects that are correlated with 
the explanatory variables under consideration. 
However, at least with respect to the union density effect this would be somewhat surprising, 
since all relevant firm characteristics identified in the relevant literature were already controlled for in 
specifications (6) and (7). Given that the identification in spell-fixed effects models relies solely on 
within-establishment variation, the result may simply be due to the fact that an increase in the degree 
of unionization in a firm might not have effects on wages in the very short run. The non-significance 
of the foreign ownership variable may be explained along similar lines as already briefly discussed in 
the previous section. Unfortunately, with the data at hand the issue cannot be conclusively resolved. 
With respect to the effect of union membership on wages and its interaction with foreign 
ownership, the results are very stable across specifications. Leaving aside the baseline regression, 
union membership has a very small but statistically significant positive impact on individual wages. 
The membership in a trade union is estimated to increase wages by between 0.57 and 0.78 per cent and 
the membership premium does not differ between workers in foreign-owned and Danish firms. Hence, 
the individual union member is able to secure a (very small) premium vis-à-vis non-members, even in 
foreign-owned firms. 
 
Union Density Dummies 
 
Table 4 reports the results from a less restrictive specification. Instead of a linear union 
density term, four dummy variables, each with a 20 per cent band, are included. A union density of 
between 40 and 60 per cent serves as the reference category. The point estimates of the dummy 
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variables are generally increasing thereby confirming a positive wage effect of union density. 
However, once a certain threshold is reached, there seems to be no further wage effects. The point 
estimates of the dummies for a density of 60 to 80 and 80 to 100 per cent are almost identical. 
In comparison to the linear specification, the estimates of unions’ overall influence on wages 
are somewhat larger. According to specifications (2) to (7), workers in highly unionised firms (union 
density of 80 to 100 per cent) earn between 2.20 and 3.36 per cent higher wages than in firms with no 
or little union presence. The interaction terms between the dummies and foreign ownership have the 
expected signs but are only (highly) statistically significant for firms with a large proportion of union 
members among the workforce.  Therefore, in foreign-owned firms union density has only a positive 
wage effect at small to medium levels. Further increases in the degree of unionisation even exhibit a 
small negative effect on wages. Consequently, the foreign ownership premium is again found to 
decline for highly unionised enterprises. While the wage premium amounts to between 2.30 and 3.36 
among firms in the lowest union density band,13 the estimate shrinks to a value of between 0.71 and 
1.10 per cent for workers employed in firms with a degree of trade union organisation of at least 80 
per cent.14 
Finally, the spell-fixed effects model, reported in column (8), comes up with estimates that are 
consistent with previous specifications in terms of the estimated sign of the union density dummies 
and the corresponding interaction terms.  However, estimates are largely statistically insignificant and 
no evidence for a foreign ownership premium can be established. 
 
6.2 Large Enterprises Only 
 
In a second step I restrict the analysis to firms with at least 35 full-time equivalent employees and 
tested the robustness of our results. The reasons for doing so are threefold. First, in small firms the 
measure of trade union density is likely to be very noisy since the measure is sensitive to the hiring or 
firing of a single worker. Second, foreign owned firms are typically large in size. More importantly, 
the definition of foreign ownership impedes the identification of small foreign-owned firms in the data 
set. Third, the role of trade unions and collective bargaining agreements may differ between smaller 
and larger firms where trade unions can be expected to play a more important role in the latter type of 
firms. 
The threshold of 35 employees is clearly somewhat arbitrary. It was chosen because in Denmark a 
Cooperation Committee with equal representation from employer and employees can be set up in 
companies with more than 35 employees if one of the parties wishes to do so. Hence, one might expect 
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 Since interaction terms between foreign ownership and union density dummies are generally not statistically 
significant for the lower density ranges, the coeffient on the foreign ownership variable applies to all firms with 
union density levels between zero and up to 60 per cent. Hence, the ownership premium does not vary across 
firms with lower and medium levels of unionisation.  
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unions to have a say in these firms. At about two thirds of all workers in the data set are employed in 
firms with more than 35 employees. 
The estimation results for the restricted sample are depicted in Tables 5 and 6. As before, first a 
linear relation between union density and individual wages is postulated. The coefficient on the 
foreign ownership variable remains positive and generally statistically significant but the size shrinks. 
In specification (2) to (7) the coefficient varies between .0164 and .0228. On contrary, the union 
density effect increases markedly and can now be found even after controlling for firm specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
The interaction term between foreign ownership and union density has the expected negative sign 
(even in the spell fixed effects estimation) but statistical significance fluctuates around the 10 per cent 
level. Interestingly, the size of the coefficient suggests that the foreign ownership premium vanishes 
almost completely in fully unionised firms. The estimates also imply that unions retain some influence 
on wages in foreign-owned firms with more than 35 employees. The coefficient of the interaction term 
is always smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient of the union density variable. 
Since the assumption of a linear relation between union density and wages may be too restrictive, I 
re-estimate the model with union density dummies. In general, the results confirm the findings of the 
previous sub-section. Foreign ownership enters with a positive sign and is highly statistically 
significant. Once control variables are added, the coefficient estimates fluctuate around .02. 
Union density has a positive and statistically significant effect on wages, a finding which is largely 
confirmed even by the spell-fixed effects regression.15 As evident from the interaction terms, the 
positive effect is almost completely offset - compared to the reference group - in foreign-owned firms 
with a high degree of unionisation. For workers employed in these firms, by far the majority in 
Denmark, the foreign ownership premium is still positive but tends to zero.  
Finally, the results for the union membership effect are almost identical compared to the 
regression results for the complete sample. Individual membership is associated with a wage premium 
of between .45 and .68 per cent. Foreign ownership has no effect on the membership premium.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The paper at hand has presented first empirical evidence on the impact of foreign ownership on 
union wage effects. Confirming the theoretical prediction, the positive wage effect of plant-level 
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 However, the dummy for firms with a union density of below 20 per cent is mostly insignifcant and often even 
positive in size (though never signifcant and nonnegative). This would indicate that employees would not lose 
out from working in non-unionised firms when compared to the reference group. In three out of eight 
specifications, Ialso find a relatively large and weakly statistically significant negative coefficient on the 
interaction between foreign ownership and a union density of below 20 per cent. The estimate implies a negative 
wage effect of foreign takeovers for firms with little or no trade union presence. However, the proportion of 
larger firms with a union density of less than 20 per cent is negligleable in Denmark. Hence, the results should 
be taken with some caution as identification rest on few observations that may come from workers employed in 
peculiar firms. 
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unionisation in Denmark is found to vanish in foreign-owned firm. The (very small) union 
membership premium does not vary between Danish and foreign-owned firms. 
While wages of workers employed in non-unionised firms are found to be between two and four 
per cent higher in foreign-owned firms, the foreign ownership premium tends to zero for workers 
employed in highly unionised enterprises. The result might help to understand why trade unions resist 
foreign take-overs even though the existence of a positive foreign ownership wage premium is widely 
acknowledged in the literature. 
I believe that the effects established for Denmark are also of general significance. Nevertheless, 
Denmark is characterised by some peculiar institutional features, in particular a very high level of 
unionisation. Comparing the results with evidence from other countries with different institutional 
settings would therefore be an interesting exercise. Another interesting aspect for future work is to 
distinguish between the union wage effects in foreign-owned firms, national firms and in domestic 
multinationals. 
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Appendix: Tables 
 
 All Workers Union Members Working in High Density 
Firm (> 75 %) 
 Foreign Non-
Foreign 
Foreign Non-
Foreign 
Foreign Non-
Foreign 
log hourly 
wage 5.285 5.173 5.252 5.160 5.227 5.162 
tenure  6.234 6.107 6.399 6.126 6.732 6.268 
age 43.26 43.58 43.47 43.55 43.80 43.72 
experience 20.02 20.11 20.35 20.40 20.54 20.48 
low-skilled  .2608 .2767 .2883 .2951 .3034 .2998 
medium-
skilled .5729 .6071 .5802 .6112 .5750 .6062 
high-skilled .1663 .1162 .1314 .0937 .1216 .0940 
immigrant  .0668 .0511 .0669 .0512 .0691 .0511 
female  .3197 .3153 .3004 .2998 .3008 .2946 
union member .8299 .8321 1.000 1.000 .8953 .9119 
Copenhagen .4392 .2920 .3945 .2684 .3511 .2479 
city  .2901 .3481 .3088 .3549 .3262 .3626 
rural .2758 .3713 .3023 .3884 .3287 .4019 
N 331247 1838030 274907 1529418 255743 1445665 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the Individual Level 
 
 All Firms High Density (> 75 %) 
 Foreign Non-Foreign Foreign Non-Foreign 
General Characteristics 
export .2482 .0620 .2783 .0581 
firm size 82.56 15.56 102.6 18.95 
capital/labour 5454 906.0 1160 906.3 
Sector 
agriculture .0046 .0015 .0074 .0017 
manufacturing .2095 .1625 .3175 .1828 
construction .0183 .1856 .0265 .2225 
trade .5337 .3775 .4861 .3448 
transport .0587 .0898 .0480 .0974 
financial intermed. .1797 .1846 .1219 .1526 
Workforce Characteristics 
fraction low-skilled .1722 .2564 .2103 .2720 
fraction medium-
skilled 
.6157 .6551 .6283 .6571 
fraction high-skilled .2121 .0886 .1614 .0709 
N 6281 191992 3625 119442 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the Firm Level 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign .0616*** .0353*** .0353*** .0351*** .0409*** .0356*** .0317*** -.0085 
UD .0532*** .0174*** .0174*** .0172*** .0152*** .0098** .0113** .0036 
UD * Foreign -.0564*** -.0269*** -.0269*** -.0267*** -.0332*** -.0315*** -.0268*** .0046 
UM -.0021 .0070 .0070*** .0070*** .0072*** .0078*** .0076*** .0061*** 
UM * Foreign .0067*** .0022 .0022 .0021 .0022 .0011 .0007 .0035 
Individual Charact. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Co-worker Charact. No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No No Yes 
R² (within) .0023 .0855 .0870 .0879 .0882 .0913 .0918 .1058 
N 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 
***
, 
**
,
*
 statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors were calculated with clustering by firms. 
 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimation Results: Complete Sample, Linear Union Density Term 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign .0402*** (.0069) 
.0248*** 
(.0048) 
.0249*** 
(.0046) 
.0247*** 
(.0046) 
.0266*** 
(.0047) 
.0229*** 
(.0048) 
.0216*** 
(.0048) 
-.0033 
(.0067) 
UD1 -.0218*** (.0047) 
-.0222*** 
(.0034) 
-.0229*** 
(.0033) 
-.0225*** 
(.0033) 
-.0223*** 
(.0033) 
-.0155*** 
(.0031) 
-.0160* 
(.0031) 
-.0054* 
(.0030) 
UD2 -.0122** (.0057) 
-.0062*** 
(.0024) 
-.0075*** 
(.0022) 
-.0073*** 
(.0022) 
-.0071*** 
(.0023) 
-.0041* 
(.0022) 
-.0042* 
(.0022) 
-.0025 
(.0022) 
UD4 .0174*** (.0049). 
.0098*** 
(.0021) 
.0097*** 
(.0017) 
.0096*** 
(.0017) 
.0095*** 
(.0018) 
.0075*** 
(.0021) 
.0074*** 
(.0021) 
.0044 
(.0028) 
UD5 .0252*** (.0061) 
.0097*** 
(.0025) 
.0107*** 
(.0021) 
.0106*** 
(.0021) 
.0098*** 
(.0022) 
.0065** 
(.0026) 
.0070*** 
(.0025) 
.0025 
(.0037) 
UD1 * Foreign .0304** (.0140) 
.0150 
(.0161) 
.0131 
(.0170) 
.0131 
(.0170) 
.0135 
(.0165) 
.0062 
 (.0204) 
.0067 
(.0192) 
.0271** 
(.0135) 
UD2 * Foreign .0218 (.0147) 
.0153 
(.0118) 
.0159 
(.0116) 
.0157 
(.0116) 
.0152 
(.0116) 
.0176 
(.0118) 
.0182 
 (.0117) 
.0048 
(.0145) 
UD4 * Foreign -.0224*** (.0065) 
-.0125*** 
(.0045) 
-.0127*** 
(.0042) 
-.0123*** 
(.0042) 
-.0124*** 
 (.0043) 
-.0126*** 
(.0044) 
-.0121*** 
(.0043) 
-.0063 
(.0053) 
UD5 * Foreign -.0293*** (.0078) 
-.0139*** 
(.0046) 
-.0139*** 
(.0043) 
-.0137*** 
(.0043) 
-.0157*** 
(.0044) 
-.0158*** 
(.0044) 
-.0142*** 
(.0044) 
-.0008 
(.0058) 
UM -.0013 (.0029) 
.0060*** 
(.0014) 
.0057*** 
(.0014) 
.0057*** 
(.0014) 
.0059*** 
(.0014) 
.0068*** 
(.0015) 
.0067*** 
(.0015) 
.0057*** 
(.0016) 
UM * Foreign .0060** (.0028) 
.0020 
(.0024) 
.0024 
(.0024) 
.0024 
(.0024) 
.0023 
(.0024) 
.0011 
(.0024) 
.0009 
(.0024) 
.0041 
(.0034) 
Individual Charact. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Co-worker Charact. No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No No Yes 
R² (within) .0023 .0858 .0872 .0881 .0885 .0915 .0920 .1059 
N 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 2169277 
***
, 
**
,
*
 statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors, reported in brackets, were calculated with clustering by firms. 
UD1:  0.0 ≤ UD < 0.2;  UD2: 0.2 ≤ UD< 0.4; UD4: 0.6 ≤ UD < 0.8; UD5: 0.8 ≤ UD ≤ 1.0. 
 
Table 4: Fixed Effects Estimation Results: Complete Sample, Union Density Dummies 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Linear Union Density Term 
Foreign .0493* .0228** .0194* .193* .0222** .0220** .0164 .0019 
UD .0562 .0293** .0293*** .0291*** .0294*** .0290*** .0416*** .0358*** 
UD * Foreign -.0452 -.0222* -.0178 -.0177 -.0207* -.0211* -.0151 -.0078 
UM .0033 .0068*** .0065*** .0066*** .0065*** .0066*** .0055*** .0045** 
UM * Foreign .0024 .0015 .0016 .0016 .0017 .0014 .0017 .0049 
Individual Charact. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Co-worker Charact. No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No No Yes 
R² (within) .0012 .0012 .1136 .1144 .1147 .1152 .1168 .1254 
N 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 
***
, 
**
,
*
 statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors were calculated with clustering by firms. 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects Estimation Results: Firms with more than 35 Employees, Linear Union Density Term 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign .0494*** (.0130) 
.0207*** 
(.0070) 
.0196*** 
(.0066) 
.0195*** 
(.0066) 
.0211*** 
(.0067) 
.0213*** 
(.0067) 
.0188*** 
(.0067) 
.0063 
(.0090) 
UD1 -.0548*** (.0225) 
.0198 
 (.0260) 
.0178  
(.0257) 
.0186 
(.0257) 
.0212 
(.0258) 
.0192 
(.0254) 
.0083 
(.0260) 
-.0235** 
(.0095) 
UD2 -.0373*** (.0106) 
-.0123 
 (.0084) 
-.0149*  
(.0078) 
-.0146* 
(.0079) 
-.0133* 
(.0076) 
-.0129* 
(.0075) 
-.0158** 
(.0078) 
-.0083 
(.0053) 
UD4 .0392*** 
 (.0135) 
.0168*** 
 (.0045) 
.0152***  
(.0040) 
.0151*** 
(.0040) 
.0151*** 
(.0039) 
.0150*** 
(.0040) 
.0148*** 
 (.0037) 
.0126** 
(.0056) 
UD5 .0341*** (.0158) 
.0171*** 
 (.0046) 
.0158***  
 (.0039) 
.0158*** 
(.0039) 
.0160*** 
(.0039) 
.0153*** 
(.0040) 
.0175*** 
(.0036) 
.0116* 
(.0066) 
UD1 * Foreign .0007 (.0255) 
-.0344 
 (.0303) 
-.0386  
(.0299) 
-.0389 
(.0298) 
-.0521* 
(.0305) 
-.0598* 
(.0305) 
-.0537* 
(.0322) 
.0042 
(.0144) 
UD2 * Foreign .0243 (.0311) 
-.0014 
( .0231) 
.0011  
(.0226) 
.0004 
(.0226) 
-.0016 
(.0224) 
-.0004 
(.0222) 
.0043 
(.0226) 
-.0140 
(.0239) 
UD4 * Foreign -.0437*** (.0132) 
-.0180*** 
 (.0069) 
-.0171***  
(.0065) 
-.0169*** 
(.0065) 
-.0166** 
(.0065) 
-.0171*** 
(.0066) 
-.0160** 
(.0065) 
-.0149* 
(.0082) 
UD5 * Foreign -.0398*** (.0141) 
-.0166*** 
 (.0067) 
-.0150**  
(.0062) 
-.0149** 
(.0062) 
-.0165*** 
(.0063) 
-.0174*** 
(.0064) 
-.0149** 
(.0063) 
-.0094 
(.0085) 
UM .0025 (.0028) 
.0067*** 
  (.0021) 
.0065***  
  (.0021) 
.0066*** 
(.0021) 
.0065*** 
(.0021) 
.0067*** 
(.0021) 
.0063*** 
(.0022) 
.0059*** 
(.0022) 
UM * Foreign .0021 (.0032) 
.0006 
 (.0028) 
.0008 
(.0027) 
.0008 
(.0027) 
.0009 
(.0027) 
.0005 
(.0027) 
.0008 
 (.0027) 
.0040 
(.0037) 
Individual Charact. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Co-worker Charact. No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No No Yes 
R² (within) .0023 .1123 .1138 .1145 .1149 .1153 .1168 .1253 
N 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 1445201 
***
, 
**
,
*
 statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors, reported in brackets, were calculated with clustering by firms. 
UD1:  0.0 ≤ UD < 0.2;  UD2: 0.2 ≤ UD< 0.4; UD4: 0.6 ≤ UD < 0.8; UD5: 0.8 ≤ UD ≤ 1.0. 
 
Table 6: Fixed Effects Estimation Results: Firms with more than 35 Employees, Union Density Dummies 
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